Since its foundation, the European Union (EU) has accomplished a variety of achievements as a supranational entity: it has effectively maintained peace within the region, created efficient monetary policies and has proven to be a powerful governmental union. However, the EU has faced several crises that have called into question its legitimacy and stability as an inter-state organizational structure; one of these being Eurosclerosis, which created a sense of “uncertainty and self-doubt” (Ross, 2011: 1) in the European integration process.
This period of stagnation within the EU largely took place between the 1970s and 1980s and is defined by a deceleration of its eco-political integration process within the European Economic Community (EEC), reinforced by global economic issues.
However, there are many adoptable perspectives that could explain how this crisis came to be, related to European integration theories rather than external factors. Although they do leave much to be explained, neo-functionalism, classical intergovernmentalism, and historical institutionalism best illustrate how Eurosclerosis arose.
Neo-functionalism is based on a form of technocratic and functional governance in which the EU’s interests are upheld due to several processes that favor the development of the structure’s supranational policies, which is relevant to Eurosclerosis as these processes in part can explain the crisis’ emergence.
Neo-functionalism establishes the concept of “sectoral integration” (Pollack, 2005: 359) which posits that developments achieved within certain policy areas can further extend such development to neighboring policy spheres embodying similar objectives.
This concept is known as “spillover” (Jensen, 2019: 6) and often refers to how notions of economic and political integration interplay with one another within institutional reforms.
The founder of this concept, Ernst Haas, explores the intricacies of spillover by first studying the dynamics of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), which he describes as a “combined social welfare-economic democracy” (Haas, 1958: 292), meaning it was founded upon eco-political means of unification.
Spillover became a widespread phenomenon, exemplified through numerous cases studies. For example, “creating a common market for cars would spill over to cooperation on car safety equipment to establish a common market” (Jensen, 2019: 4).
Additionally, the foundation of supranational and subnational actors – such as the European Commission and various interest groups – “create[d] additional pressures for further integration” (Pollack, 2005: 359) illustrated by how new members were added in 1973 and the creation of monetary policies - such as the Common Agricultural Policy and the Werner Report - strengthened altogether the European integration process.
Despite how neo-functionalism advocated for supranationalism as “governments become…more reactive…to changes in the supranational environment to which they belong” (Sandholtz, Sweet, 2014: 234) this integration theory is emboldened nonetheless in their national interests that have allowed for this supranational power to be developed.
Much debate surrounds how national actors’ loyalties are compromised in light of a “shift from the national to the European level” (Sandholtz, Sweet, 2014: 235), as it would be seemingly “difficult…to reconcile their aims with the supranational economic and political organization of Europe” (Haas, 1958: 296).
The ECSC’s spillover occurred due to the “expectations developing purely in the national contexts of the elites involved” (Hans, 1958: 292).
Although the theory’s characteristics could explain the crisis, the mere presence of Eurosclerosis denigrates the neo-functional assumption that federal values should be uplifted within the European integration process.
This is exemplified through the “Empty Chair Crisis” in Which French President Charles de Gaulle expressed his “strong anti-federalist views about EEC institutions” by ordering French Ministers to “[refuse] to participate in Council meetings” (Phinnemore, 2019: 10).
This was a detrimental blow to the federal operation of the EEC “because the absence of any member state from key meetings meant immediate paralysis” (Ross, 2011: 11).
Moreover, neo-functionalism takes little into account the importance of domestic interests in the European integration process, which became the root-cause for the emergence of Eurosclerosis.
Classical intergovernmentalism challenges the neo-functionalist assumption that the European integration process should follow a supranational path in its ongoing formation by positing that governmental interests should be prioritized and that members of the union retain their primacy.
Classical intergovernmentalism establishes that governments drive the integration process and therefore their interests should be considered as a priority. Their decision-making powers are translated through their ability to “produce common policies” that will reinforce “interstate bargaining” (Sandholtz, Sweet, 2014: 236).
This is relative to Eurosclerosis, a crisis brought by the fervent desire to maintain sovereign matters, to the detriment of the supranational integration process.
In response to the growing economic issues of the 1970s, ranging from “international currency instability” to “the 1973 oil crises”, European member states began “pursuing national as opposed to coordinated European responses” (Phinnemore, 2019: 15), a pursuit reinforced by the Eurosceptic sentiments shared by many states in light of the Empty Chair Crisis that had taken place only a couple of years prior, regarded as a “‘boycott’ of…European institutions” (Cini, 2019: 6).
Furthermore, new additions to the EEC made their resistance towards the “gradual transfer of sovereignty to the Community” clear, establishing that “EC decision making would reflect the continuing primacy of the nation-state” (Pollack, 2005: 360).
The European integration process EEC officials had aimed for came at a halt, a reflection of “the limits of supranationalism” (Cini, 2019: 7).
Classical intergovernmentalism presents an explanation for the crisis as it indicated a prominent surgency of nationalism in an increasingly supranational environment, postulated in the theory itself.
A number of eco-political factors, such as the “the persistence of the national veto after 1966” (Cini, 2019: 7) and “chronic trade deficits” (Ross, 2011: 13) reinforced Eurosclerosis’ period of stagnation. The crisis is indicative of “the resilience of the nation-state” (Pollack, 2005: 360) in European intergovernmental politics.
Despite the close ties linking classical intergovernmentalism to Eurosclerosis, the former does not delve nearly enough into how ongoing historical currents make of domestic interests a lasting focal point in political relations.
Historical institutionalism, an integration theory characterized by its focus on the historical relationship between institutions and state actors, more specifically on how “the effects of institutions over time…can influence or constrain the behavior of the actors who established them” (Pollack, 2005: 363) interplays with Eurosclerosis as this crisis centered itself precisely on this theory’s focal point.
Institutionalism by design is defined by the role non-domestic institutions adopt in political matters. The establishment of supranational structures form “interests and ongoing agendas” (Rosamond, 2019: 9) that become the center point for governmental agents in relation to such institutions.
Historical institutionalism does not focus solely on the ties between the institutional level and the state level: it studies this interrelation through a fundamentally historical lens, centralized on how patterns develop lasting influences that permeates through time.
This refers to “path dependence” whereby “decisions provide incentives for actors to perpetuate institutional and policy choices inherited from the past” (Pollack, 2005: 363). Following this logic, political agents would find difficulties in rupturing from past processes, enshrined in now normalized political currents. Historical institutionalists offer “a tool kit for predicting and explaining under what conditions” one may expect “path-dependent behavior” (Pollack, 2005: 364) in the political sphere.
Furthermore, historical institutionalism can be tied to Eurosclerosis as the path dependence theory aligns itself with the origins and dynamics of the crisis.
It represented a resurgence of national ideals that defined the increasingly supranational nature of the European integration process.
This is pertinent when considering how supranationalism was not a normalized political ideal during the time of the crisis, despite the efforts of EEC officials to achieve this feat.
Path dependence logic is relevant in the context of this crisis because a focus on domestic – rather than supranational - interests was deemed conventional by the political environment of that period.
Additionally, the foundation of this structure originally embodied a concern for the national security of two major member states following an era of major political turmoil that nearly destroyed Europe.
Despite the increasing normalization of federalism in the European integration process, the EEC still had a strained relation with supranational ideals as member state officials – many of which were present during the ECSC period - sought to continuously defend their national interests as part of a historical continuum.
For example, De Gaulle, like other EEC officials, aimed to uphold the long-established assumption that the European integration process is meant to remain centered on the intergovernmental and national level.
Despite how historical institutionalism’s defining characteristics can be interpreted in a way that could explain Eurosclerosis, the inherent definition focuses more on how institutions “shape historical trajectories over time” (Pollack, 2005: 363), meaning they become the focal points in historical and political continuums as “gaps may occur in the ability of member governments to control the subsequent development of institutions and policies” (Pollack, 2005: 363-4).
The theory’s focus on “bureau-shaping agendas and [pre-existing institutions’] preference for self-preservation” (Rosamond, 2019: 10) accord these structures their power, rendering them more influential than the state actors they have relations with.
While the ECSC was founded to “rescue the nation state”, the European integration process is now at a “critical juncture” (Rosamond, 2019: 10), engineered to fulfill the opposite.
To conclude, the numerous theories discussed above all provide - to an extent - an explanation for Eurosclerosis that explore the crisis’ origins and dynamics; however, it is arguably classical intergovernmentalism that provides the most reasonable delineation of this period of stagnation for the European integration process.
Although the crisis cannot entirely be explained by integration theories - seeing as there were economic crises that reinforced existing political hostilities - this theory was not only founded during the crisis’ emergence (reflecting the historical relevancy of the former in relation to the latter) but on the basis that primacy should be provided to the national interests of member states in light of the growing supranational federal movement that persevered in the EEC.
It reflected the period’s Eurosceptic sentiments on the part of member states that rejected the institutions’ supranational objectives, determining these were not in their national interest.
Bibliography
Cini, M. 2019, European Union Politics, Intergovernmentalism, Oxford University Press, Sixth Edition, 6-7
Haas, E. 1958, The Uniting of Europe: Political Social and Economic Forces, 1950-1957, University of Notre Dame Press, First Edition, 292-296
Jensen, C. S. 2019, European Union Politics, Neo-Functionalism, Oxford University Press, Sixth Edition, 4-6
Phinnemore, D. 2019, European Union Politics, The European Union: Establishment and Development, Oxford University Press, Sixth Edition, 10-15
Pollack, M. 2005, Theorizing the European Union: International Organization, Domestic Polity, or Experiment in New Governance?, Annual Review of Political Science, Temple University Press, 359-364
Rosamond, B. 2019, European Union Politics, Theorizing the European Union after Integration Theory, Oxford University Press, Sixth Edition, 9-10
Ross, G. 2011, The European Union and Its Crises: Through the Eyes of the Brussels Elite,
Palgrave MacMillan, First Edition, 1-13
Sandholtz, W. Sweet, A. 2014, The European Union: Readings on the Theory and Practice of European Integration, Palgrave MacMillan, Fourth Edition, 234-236
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