Humanitarian intervention, defined as the “entry into a country of the armed forces of another country or international organization with the aim of protecting citizens from persecution or the violation of their human right” (Brown, McLean, McMillan, 2018: 265), has established itself in the twenty-first century as a means to enact international relations in a way that seemingly prioritizes human rights. With populations across the globe falling prey to civil wars, ethnic conflicts, and human rights abuses, often provoked by the governments designed to protect them, humanitarian intervention appears to be an ideal solution to these issues.
Yet despite humanitarian activity’s seemingly virtuous exterior, it has been subject to much criticism. Most “do not disagree with the judgment that the situations that…call for intervention are morally abhorrent” (Holzgrefe, Keohane, 2003: 94). However, some critics question the motives behind such intervention as well as its ultimate effectiveness. Keeping that in mind, what justifies the case against humanitarian intervention?
I will begin answering this question first by explaining all of the ways in which humanitarian intervention is used as an excuse to exert influence and dominance over vulnerable nations, furthering the agenda of the intervening countries. I will follow this point by arguing that humanitarian intervention often worsens the situations it purports to help due to a lack of understanding by foreign bodies. Finally, I will demonstrate how humanitarian intervention should not occupy a prevalent place within international law as it assumes values that are not found within its principles.
Humanitarian intervention has been heavily criticized for its inherently polarizing nature: despite centering itself around altruistic principles that value human rights, it is a fundamentally political act that implies the “threat of military force” (Holzgrefe, Keohane, 2003: 94). Essentially, “states almost always have mixed motives for intervening, and are rarely prepared to sacrifice their own soldiers overseas unless they have self-interested reasons for doing so” (Baylis, 1997: 482). There are many examples of such opportunism, such as the ethnic cleansing which occurred in Rwanda in 1994. In this case, victims of this genocide were the Tutsis, a Rwandan minority who nonetheless occupied a very prominent position within Rwandan society.
The perpetrators were the Hutus, a Rwandan majority group who had been significantly undermined by the Tutsis for generations.
This triggered a conflict of such magnitude that within the span of three months, between 800 000 and 1 000 000 Rwandans were massacred, prompting the intervention of nation-states such as France.
While France claimed establishing a military presence would help preventing further escalation, its motives were clouded by a desire to maintain post-colonial influence in Rwanda. Indeed, French politicians feared that Rwanda “would have succumbed to the anglophones” (Baylis, Owens, Smith, 1997: 484) thereby diminishing France’s political influence.
Nation-states are not the only entities guilty of this kind opportunism. International organizations are equally capable of harboring ulterior motives in their decision-making. An example of this is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), one of the key political institutions during this “golden era” of humanitarian activism, which became embroiled in the Kosovan civil war in 1998.
As in Rwanda, tensions arose between ethnic groups within this territory, eventually leading to a conflict between ethnic Serbs and ethnic Albanians that resulted in the deaths of 13 000 individuals and the displacement of more than a million Serbs and Albanians (Plesch, 2015).
NATO recognized that “Serbian actions in Kosovo had created a humanitarian emergency and breached international legal commitments,” which were “challenging common humanity” (Baylis, Owens, Smith, 1997: 484) and subsequently intervened.
However, as seen in the previous case, their reasons resulted from “mixed motives” (Baylis, Owens, Smith 1997: 484). For one, NATO worried that the Serbian military leader Slobodan Milosevic “would replicate the carnage of Bosnia” (Baylis, Owens, Smith, 1997: 484) in Kosovan territory, which in turn might prompt criticism of the organization for not taking preventative measures. In addition, seeing that many civilians in the area had already fled to Western Europe to escape the violence of the civil wars, NATO intervened in order to prevent “a massive refugee crisis in Europe” (Baylis, Owens, Smith, 1997: 484). NATO was thus as concerned about helping Western states as it was about Kosovo.
These examples clearly make a powerful case against humanitarian intervention on the basis that it can be used to benefit entities driven by a desire to assert influence or protect themselves internationally, rather than a desire to prioritize human rights on a global scale.
However, this is not the only argument against humanitarian intervention. Many believe it should not the permitted on the grounds that the intervening states comprehend too little about the conflicts they are inserting themselves in, which has led some vulnerable nations to end up worse off than where they started.
The concept of affluent nations involving themselves in the political turmoil of other states, with whom they have little social, political and cultural rapport, is relatively new to the twentieth and twenty-first century. The previous Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, stated that humanitarian intervention is a “developing international norm” (Baylis, Owens, Smith, 1997: 480) stemming from the Libyan humanitarian crisis in 2011. Yet despite the fact that nations today have made much progress in terms of interdependence due to globalization, distinct socio-economic grievances remain, dividing countries’ interests. For humanitarian intervention to function in a way that benefits both parties, essentially, social, economic and cultural barriers between countries must be erased.
However, nation-states are still largely defined by these barriers, making it difficult for intervening nations to fully understand the nuances of the socio-political turmoil within the countries they are supposedly aiding. Intervention could therefore cause even more turbulence within countries that are already characterized by fragility. An example of this is Libya, which in 2011 experienced an “uprising against Muammar Qaddafi” a dictator “who had dominated Libya for forty-two years” (Filkins, 2019: 10).
A number of Western nations – including France, the United Kingdom and the United States – quickly intervened on humanitarian grounds. When Qaddafi understood that rebel groups were receiving international aid, he began threatening them by stating “‘We are coming tonight,’…and for rebels who do not lay down their arms ‘there will be no mercy.’” (Filkins, 2019: 12) As a result, the conflict worsened, resulting in prolonged fighting and even more civilian casualties.
Much of this turmoil resulted from the fact that American politicians believed Qaddafi had to be removed as “civilians would not be safe as long as [he] was in power” (Filkins, 2019: 15).
However, they did take into account how deeply Qaddafi’s influence went, which meant that deposing the man himself did not lessen his impact. In addition, American military support for rebel groups who wanted to overthrow Qaddafi were initially prompted by democratic ideals that appealed to Western principles of liberalism and secularism, values that Libya does not necessarily prioritize in the same way.
The American government installed short-term measures as an attempt to alleviate human suffering, without taking into account Libya’s underlying socio-political dynamics. These measures were ultimately unsuccessful, and much carnage ensued. It is possible that had “Qaddafi…put down the uprising in Benghazi, the rebellion might have ended altogether” (Filkins, 2019: 13). Despite the fact that a “tyrant would have remained in power” (Filkins, 2019: 13), fewer Libyans would have died under Qaddafi’s continued rule than under the period of intervention.
Afghanistan is another case where humanitarian intervention has caused far more damage to the country than was originally intended. Similar to Libya, Afghanistan’s history has been characterized by political unrest. Afghan civilians were subject to tyrannical conditions stemming from the Taliban government and the discrimination it has enacted against minorities, which led to many civil conflicts.
When these began to receive international attention in 2001, Western nations sought to intervene to prevent more human rights abuses. The US adopted a major role in Afghanistan, but despite the altruistic sentiment that motivated the action, the American government made little efforts to fully comprehend the origins of Afghan political turmoil, nor the origins of anti-Western sentiment within the country, which stemmed partly from Soviet influence during the Soviet-Afghan war.
The US intervention came across as anti-Islam, engendering much animosity.
Essentially, the “campaign in Afghanistan soon ended up doing what it was supposed to eliminate: terrorizing civilians” (Bello, 2003: 3). According to the UN mission, “9,579 civilians were killed in the conflict between 2006 and 2010” (Bello, 2003: 3). Through the investigation of the case studies above, it is clear that Western nations should not intervene in the internal affairs of countries with whom they share little social, political, economic and cultural understanding.
A final argument against humanitarian intervention arises from the fact that it should not be considered legitimate in international law for two reasons: firstly, humanitarian intervention rests upon a sense of universal morality. However, morality utterly relative to each nation-state and should not have a place in politics and law. Secondly, it is exceedingly difficult to enforce such laws, thus rendering them ineffective.
International law – and humanitarian intervention by association - has been heavily contested since its rise in legitimacy following the emergence of globalization. Realist ideologues like Morgenthau have argued that international law is “a tool to be used by the powerful in pursuit of even greater power” (Scott, 1994: 319) and that contrarily to what advocates of humanitarian intervention believe – that this source of aid rests upon principles of morality and interdependence – moral ideals should not even occupy a place within politics, whether it be on a domestic or international level.
Indeed, international law was founded with the intention of bringing nation-states to social, economic and political consensuses in order to establish a structured world order, not necessarily to prioritize liberal ideals. The relativist position protests the use of “liberal political theory to address humanitarian intervention – or…any international question” for the reason that “the world is ideologically and culturally too diverse to apply any one philosophy to a problem that concerns all persons in the globe” (Holzgrefe, Keohane, 2003: 100).
Furthermore, it is exceedingly difficult for international bodies to install laws that allow for humanitarian intervention to be adopted worldwide because its principles are not globally respected. One of the guiding legal principles that has significantly shaped humanitarian intervention is that of the “Responsibility to Protect”, or “RtoP.” According to the United Nations, this “embodies a political commitment to end the worst forms of violence and persecution”.
Essentially, “all states have a permanent responsibility to protect their populations” from “from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity” (Baylis, Owens, Smith, 1997: 488). The UN endorsed RtoP during the 2005 World Summit and it was “signed on” by “nearly 200 states” (Menon, 2016: 3).
However, RtoP in action did not have the intended effects. Due to a “lack of implementation mechanisms in human-rights agreements”, nations having “duly affix[ed] their signatures” (Menon, 2016: 4) do not obey the principles stated in the consensus. Leaders of totalitarian regimes have willingly signed RtoP yet openly contest its principles. It has been suggested that dictators do not suffer many repercussions for their actions because they have allies within the organizations where the humanitarian agreements are enacted.
This is exemplified through the Syrian dictator Bashad al-Assad, who utilized chemical weapons as a means of oppression on his citizens – leading to a civil war that has taken the lives of over 400 000 people – yet suffered little consequences for disobeying RtoP because he has allies in the UN Security Council. This highlights the ineffectiveness of the legal basis for humanitarian intervention, which cannot be applied to nations worldwide and therefore should not hold a prominent place in international law.
In conclusion, I believe I have made a strong case against humanitarian intervention based on how it generally lacks legitimacy on a global scale. Despite its seemingly virtuous values, such activity has shown to be a means of undue political influence, often worsens a situation it sets out to improve, and has little standing in international law.
I do not disagree with humanitarian sentiment in of itself; further efforts must be made to rid the world of human suffering in a way that prioritizes those who are victimized and oppressed. But humanitarian work should be in the best interests of individuals that need it most, not used as an excuse by the countries that possess the most privilege to entangle themselves in the affairs of other nations, imposing their ideals and in the end accomplishing little to prioritize human rights on a global scale.
Bibliography
Baylis, J. Owens, P. Smith, S. 1997, The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, Oxford University Press, Sixth Edition, 480-484
Bello, W. 2011, The Crisis of Humanitarian Intervention, Global Policy Forum, Foreign Policy in Focus, 3-4
Brown, I. McLean, I. McMillan, A. 2018, Oxford Concise Dictionary of Politics and International Relations, Oxford University Press, Fourth Edition, 265-66
Filkins, D. 2019, The Moral Logic of Humanitarian Intervention, The New Yorker, Annals of Diplomacy, 10-15
Holzgrefe, J. Keohane, R. 2003, Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas, Cambridge University Press, 93-100
Menon, R. 2016, Why Humanitarian Intervention Goes Horribly Wrong, Aeon, 3-4
Plesch, V. 2015, A Painful Wait to Bury Kosovo’s Victims, Aljazeera, 3-4
Scott, S. 1994, International Law as Ideology: Theorizing the Relationship between International Law and International Politics, European Journal of International Law, 314-319